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SUMMARY
The post-cold war generation of citizens is forgetting 
nuclear weapon-related dangers and becoming indifferent 
to the issue. At the same time, the absence of mass grass-
roots, anti-nuclear protest suggests tacit support for 
current nuclear weapon policies. These three common 
diagnoses are potentially contradictory and, more 
importantly, are only assumptions. This paper is the first 
systematic attempt at assessing the attitude of the under 
30s generation of European Union (EU) citizens with 
regard to nuclear weapons. It is based on a poll of over 
10 000 citizens across the 28 EU member countries. 
The paper finds that none of these assumptions holds. 
Except for the cases of near nuclear use, the lack of 
knowledge about nuclear danger is not that widespread; it 
only increases slowly and not uniformly. Similarly, the lack 
of popular engagement in the nuclear weapon debate does 
not mean support for existing policies. In this paper, the 
sentiment of support is assessed with a set of three criteria: 
the feeling of safety attained from nuclear weapons; 
satisfaction with policies taken in one’s name; and 
acceptance of vulnerabilities arising from the possession of 
nuclear weapons. This paper finds that overall support in 
these areas is below 30 per cent in every country for which 
there was a representative sample of respondents. Neither 
do the youth express a lack of concern, but rather a strong 
feeling of inability to affect the outcome. This suggests the 
need for both a research agenda and a reform of EU 
educational policies aimed at this generation on nuclear 
weapons.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is a first effort at eliciting the attitude of 
the next generation of EU citizens towards nuclear 
weapons.1 In doing so, it offers a first assessment 
of three frequent assumptions about EU citizens’ 
attitudes towards nuclear weapons, that there is:  
(a) decreasing popular knowledge about the danger 
of nuclear weapons, (b) decreasing concern about and 
interest in the issue, and (c) continued and sufficient 
tacit support for current policies. The paper explores 
the reasons for the limited engagement of EU citizens 
in these debates, and it assesses the existence of nuclear 
exceptionalism in these attitudes. 
It is based on a large poll of 10 455 EU citizens aged 
14–30 years, across the 28 European Union (EU) 
states, conducted in July and August 2015, as a proxy 
for the next generation of EU citizens. The youngest 
participants will not be allowed to vote for a party 
with a platform on the matter in France or the United 
Kingdom, but will be affected by the decisions for 
most of their lives. The oldest participants reached 
voting age more than ten years after the end of the cold 
war and in the shadow of the terrorist attacks on the 
United States of 11 September 2001, which makes this 
cohort interesting for getting a sense of the change of 
attitude towards nuclear weapons after the end of the 
cold war. The poll involved questions on political and 
ethical attitudes towards nuclear weapons, as well as 
on an understanding of the nuclear past. The range of 
questions used had not been posed to the European 
public before.
1  The results of the poll are available at <https://
reportsdashboardclient.daliaresearch.com/#/dataset_users/65415640-
fa6a-0133-cf11-0a81e8b09a82/datasets/d3a030d0-fa6a-0133-d08e-
0a81e8b09a82/reports/1f26c900-fa6b-0133-d1f1-0a81e8b09a82/
charts/23ff8e20-fa6b-0133-d1fd-0a81e8b09a82>. For raw data, please 
contact the author. 
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The paper is divided into four sections. Section 
two discusses the rationale for and limitations of 
this study. Section three discusses and assesses the 
poll’s findings in relation to the pre-existing common 
assumptions about public attitudes to current nuclear 
weapon policies. Given a fair understanding of nuclear 
vulnerability and a very limited level of support for 
current policies, this section also investigates why 
there is not more public participation in the limited 
existing debates about nuclear weapons, and why 
there appears to be few efforts at starting a new debate, 
broadening the existing one or developing a mass 
protest movement on the issue. It shows that this lack of 
public participation is in large part driven by a feeling 
of powerlessness and not by a lack of care for the issue, 
which is contrary to a common preconception that 
often coexists with the idea of citizens’ ignorance on 
these matters. Section four summarizes the findings 
and considers their implications for further research 
and future policy.
II. THE RATIONALE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE 
STUDY
Common assumptions about public attitudes to 
nuclear weapons
Before examining the data from the poll in more detail, 
it is useful to review some of the existing common 
assumptions about European public attitudes to 
nuclear weapons. In different ways, the assumptions 
and the overall concern about nuclear forgetting 
suggest an understanding that nuclear weapon 
policies should not be conducted without popular 
understanding of them, or at least not against popular 
consent. There is also the expectation that knowledge 
of and concern over nuclear danger will be absent or 
fade away over time, while it is assumed that support 
for nuclear weapon policy will remain sufficient.2 This 
claim was even made by anti-nuclear scholars such 
as Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler at the time of the 
2  ‘A sort of nuclear amnesia set in after 1989,’ according to Booth, K., 
Theory of World Security (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2007), p. 318. See also Eisenhardt, N. and Wright, T., ‘Generations of 
change: persuading post-cold war kids that disarmament matters’, 
Disarmament Forum, 2010/4, p. 25; and Copel, E. and Norlain, B., ‘La 
dissuasion nucléaire a-t-elle encore un avenir? [Does nuclear deterrence 
still have a future?], du grain à moudre [Grain to be ground], France 
Culture, 13 Apr. 2013. 
peace dividends of the post-cold war world.3 A French 
understanding of nuclear deterrence goes so far as 
to explicitly assume that the president’s credibility 
is conditional on the support of the nation and, 
consequently, so too is the credibility of French nuclear 
threats.4 
In reality these attitudes are not known, as most of 
the literature focuses on foreign and security policy 
elites rather than the general public.5 The recent 
literature on people’s attitudes with regard to nuclear 
weapons focuses almost exclusively on the adult 
populations in the USA and the UK.6 (One exception 
was the 2008 World Public Opinion Survey asking 
people whether they would support an agreement 
to eliminate nuclear weapons.)7 Overall, polling 
on popular attitudes toward nuclear weapons was 
much more frequent during the cold war.8 There is 
no Eurobarometer survey or world values survey 
of citizens’ attitudes towards nuclear weapons and 
government polls are not interested in capturing 
ethical attitudes and understanding of nuclear history. 
3  Booth, K. and Wheeler, N., ‘Beyond nuclearism’, ed. R. Cowen-Karp, 
Security Without Nuclear Weapons: Different Perspectives on Non-
nuclear Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1992), p. 24.
4  Poirier, L., ‘A voix nue’ [Naked voice], Interview with  
Garcin, T. on ‘la dissuasion nucléaire’ [nuclear deterrence], France 
Culture, 13 Nov. 2008. See also Deniau, X., ‘Le suffrage universel et la 
dissuasion nucléaire’ [Universal suffrage and nuclear deterrence], La 
Revue des deux mondes, June–July 1998, pp. 54–55; de Champchesnel, 
T. and Coste, F., La communication en matière de nucléaire de défense 
[Communication about nuclear issues related to defence], Paris, Les 
documents du C2SD, no. 86, 2007, p. 45; and Carrère, R., ‘Réflexions 
polémo1ogiques sur la crise nucléaire de Cuba 1962’ [Polemological 
reflections on the nuclear crisis in Cuba 1962], Etudes polémologiques, 
no. 3 (Jan. 1972), pp. 34–35.
5  Hayes, J., ‘Nuclear disarmament and stability and the logic of habit’, 
Nonproliferation Review, vol. 22, no. 3–4 (2016), p. 505.
6  For the USA: Sagan, S., Valentino, B. and Press, D., ‘Atomic aversion: 
experimental evidence on taboos, traditions, and the non-use of 
nuclear weapons’, American Political Science Review, Feb. 2013; and 
CNN, Opinion Research Poll, 9–11 Apr. 2010,  <http://i2.cdn.turner.
com/cnn/2010/images/04/12/rel7b.pdf>. For the UK: Ritchie, N. and 
Ingram, P., ‘Trident in UK politics and public opinion’, British American 
Security Information Council (BASIC), July 2013; Nuclear Education 
Trust and Nuclear Information Service, ‘British military attitudes 
towards nuclear weapons and disarmament’, June 2015, <http://
www.nuclearinfo.org/sites/default/files/Military attitudes to nuclear 
weapons - full report.pdf>; and What Scotland Thinks, Opinion polls, 
<http://whatscotlandthinks.org/search?query=trident>.
7  World Public Opinion Survey, 2008, <http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/
library/opinion-polls/nuclear-weapons/world-publics-eliminating-
nukes-2008.pdf>.
8  Russett, B., ‘Democracy, public opinion and nuclear weapons’, eds 
P. Tetlock et al., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1989), vol. 1.
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The USA is also currently planning to replace its 
nuclear weapons stationed in Europe with a new 
generation of weapons by 2022, even if President 
Trump has not taken a firm stance on this issue.12 
In summary, there are numerous reasons for taking 
the time to find out about and understand public 
attitudes to nuclear weapons: the need for popular 
support as a condition for the credibility of nuclear 
weapon policies, the possible inconsistency of existing 
claims about attitudes towards them, the potential 
impact of popular mobilization on such policies, a 
concern for democracy as a representative regime, and 
the impact of the decision on future citizens who are 
not given a voice.
The methodology and definitions used in the study
By asking a new set of questions, the paper aims to 
identify ways of restoring the agency of European 
political communities in nuclear weapon politics, at 
a time when political rhetoric on the subject tends 
to deny it or make it invisible. Such rhetoric is either 
instrumental (the general public supports government 
policy), or contemptuous (the general public is ignorant 
and/or volatile and creates obstacles and resistance to 
policy implementation), or paternalistic (policymakers 
do not need to consult the general public, only to 
communicate the rationale for what they do). It works 
towards restoring that agency by assessing the reality 
of our above-mentioned preconceived assumptions 
about the next generation and by questioning why it 
is not as engaged in the nuclear weapon debate as the 
generation of adults in the 1980s.
In this paper, active support for the current nuclear 
weapon policies of European governments is defined 
as combining four elements: (a) a full understanding 
of nuclear vulnerability; (b) the idea that nuclear 
vulnerability is acceptable, possibly as the necessary 
price to pay for something or in order to avoid an 
outcome deemed worse than nuclear death; (c) a 
possible expression of satisfaction with the current 
policies conducted in the name of the citizens; and  
(d) a sense that nuclear weapons make citizens feel safe 
when they belong to their state or its allies. 
12  Kristensen, H., ‘Most nuclear weapon sites in Europe do not 
meet US security requirements, USAF Report’, FAS Strategic Security 
Blog, 19 June 2009, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2008/06/usaf-
report-mostnuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-donot-meet-us-security-
requirements/>; and Schlosser, E., ‘The H-Bombs in Turkey’, New 
Yorker, 17 July 2016.
Such polls are most often limited to measuring support 
for the policy of the day in its own terms. 
Why it matters
Understanding what public attitudes are to nuclear 
weapons is important beyond the rationales presented 
above. 
First, the two most common claims about them 
may be incompatible. If knowledge and concern are 
diminishing below a certain level or if people do not 
form opinion based on adequate information, what 
is the validity of the popular support that is being 
claimed? 
Second, scholarship conveys that popular movements 
have had a significant impact on nuclear weapon 
policies worldwide, which suggests that they may have 
an impact today or tomorrow.9 
Third, France, the UK and the USA are in the process 
of making decisions that would commit present and 
future EU citizens to live in a nuclear-armed state  
and/or continent for 40 years without giving them a 
say, either because they are under voting age or because 
they are not born yet.10 
In July 2016, the UK Parliament voted to replace the 
four Vanguard class submarines currently carrying 
the country’s nuclear weapons (Trident) with the same 
number of successor submarines (472 votes for;  
117 against). 
The French budget for nuclear forces is expected 
to double by 2025 but so far neither the presidential 
hopefuls nor the parliament suggests that citizens will 
be presented with a choice in the foreseeable future. 
(As of October 2016, 101 out of 925 French members 
of parliament and senators have signed a petition 
calling for a referendum on France’s participation in an 
international treaty to ban nuclear weapons.)11 
9  See Knopf, J., Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The 
Impact of Protest on US Arms Control Policy (Cambridge University 
Press: New York, 1998); Wittner, L., The Struggle Against the Bomb 
(Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1993, 1997, 2003), vol. 3; and 
Cameron, J., ‘From the grass roots to the summit: the impact of 
suburban protest on US missile defense policy, 1968–72’, International 
History Review, vol. 36, no. 2 (2014).
10  See Ritchie, N. and Pelopidas, B., ‘European nuclear nationalism’, 
eds N. Hynek and M. Smetana, Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, 
Political and Regional Perspectives (Routledge: London, 2016). 
11  See ‘Action des citoyens pour le desarmement nucleaire’ [Citizens’ 
action for nuclear disarmament], <http://www.acdn.net/spip/spip.
php?article1028&lang=en>. 
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The first element (a) emphasizes that support based 
on an underestimation of the danger should not be 
considered as support. 
The second element (b) derives from a common 
justification of nuclear vulnerability in the USA 
during the cold war: being taken over by communists 
was perceived as worse than dying in a nuclear war. 
This attitude is most clear in President Eisenhower’s 
statement to the British Ambassador to the USA, Sir 
Harold Caccia, in December 1959: ‘the President said 
that speaking for himself, he would rather be atomized 
than communized.’13 This paper investigates whether 
there is a post-cold war analogue to the ‘better dead 
than red’ slogan as a component of popular support for 
existing policies. 
The third element (c) recognizes that support can 
exist without being explicitly manifested. 
The fourth element (d) is based on the primary 
mission of and justification for the nuclear weapons 
stationed in Europe, at least since the 1974 Ottawa 
Declaration: to contribute to the deterrent capability 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and, beyond that, to the security of Europe. This 
is clearly stated in the French White Papers on 
Defence and National Security, as well as presidential 
speeches over time. The same idea of nuclear weapons 
as security providers can be found in the UK and 
NATO’s statements about the purpose of their nuclear 
weapons.14 As for NATO, this is clearly stated in 
Article 18 of the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and was 
reiterated at the Warsaw Summit on 8–9 July 2016.15
The limitations of the study
There are limitations to the validity of the findings of 
this study, which call for broader surveys over a longer 
period of time. 
First, the findings represent a group of people 
interested in expressing their views and technologically 
savvy since the poll was done electronically. This 
distortion was deliberate and based on the assumption 
that the next generation of EU citizens is expected to be 
more technologically savvy than the previous one. The 
respondents were reached through a network of over 
13  Wenger, A., Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nuclear 
Weapons (Rowman and Littlefield: New York, 1997), p. 201.
14  Ritchie and Pelopidas (note 10).
15  See NATO, ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué’, Warsaw Summit,  
8–9 July 2016, <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en>, bullet 52.
30 000 mobile applications and website publishers, so 
the sample frame was defined as Internet or mobile 
Internet users. To guarantee broad access to different 
demographic groups spread evenly across geographical 
regions, a highly diverse set of widely and heavily 
used application and mobile website categories was 
targeted—from news to entertainment, sports and 
games. To ensure a high degree of data quality, a ‘trust 
score’ was created, using a suite of technologies for 
tracking and measuring response data in real time. 
This score tracks user behaviour and profiles users 
across a range of metrics, such as time to complete steps 
in a survey, consistency of answers, unusual response 
patterns and other elements, including passive data 
observations, which may impact data quality. The 
trust score is not a static metric, but rather employs 
a learning algorithm that increases the predictive 
capacities of the overall system, over time, not just of 
individual users. This quality assurance measure is a 
constant feature of the system so that each interaction 
of a user with the system, in any form, iteratively 
refines the data quality. These measures complement 
more traditional approaches to avoid inconsistencies, 
random responses and other response patterns. 
Second, the wording of the questions, the set of 
available answers and the order in which the questions 
were asked may have introduced bias—respondents 
did have to answer the questions in a given order. 
However, because of this irreducible bias, once the 
reflexive and compensatory work has been done, 
‘the most valid and reliable use of survey data is for 
comparing different populations, within and between 
countries and over time’.16 Thus, the results above are 
strongly comparative across country, gender and age 
group, with a view to deciding whether it is reasonable 
to interpret what is being observed as generational 
change, with a post-cold war generation that is 
supposed to have different values and attitudes.17
Third, another limitation is related to the treatment 
of the gender variable. However, this paper does 
not exploit the findings on gender in depth because 
the available filters were too binary and the survey 
forced respondents to identify themselves as male or 
female. In spite of these methodological precautions, 
consistency over time is always an issue. This could be 
addressed by polling again, in particular after the wave 
16  Russett (note 8), footnote 3, p. 202.
17  Steele, B. and Acuff, J., ‘Introduction’, eds B. Steele and J. Acuff, 
Theory and Application of the ‘Generation’ in International Relations and 
Politics (Palgrave: Basingstoke, 2012), p. 18.
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survival of European populations has not been planned 
for and the survivability in the nuclear shelters in case 
of a nuclear attack is dubious. This section assesses 
the respondents’ knowledge of this type of nuclear 
vulnerability, which is distilled into four questions.
Question 1. Does the possession of nuclear weapons create 
vulnerability? 
Respondents had to choose one of the following five 
answers: 
(a) Yes, it makes nuclear weapon-possessing states 
primary targets of a nuclear attack against which there 
is no defence. 
(b) Yes, it does but this vulnerability is necessary for 
deterrence to work and, because deterrence works, we 
are not as vulnerable as it might appear.
(c) No, it does not: possessing nuclear weapons 
protects the country from invasion. 
(d) No, it does not: possessing nuclear weapons 
protects the country from invasion and from a nuclear 
attack.
(e) No, possessing nuclear weapons protects the 
country from invasion and from a nuclear attack or an 
attack with any other weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). 
The available answers vary in terms of the benefits 
they expect from nuclear deterrence but the last 
three show denial of an existing vulnerability 
associated with the existence of nuclear weapons. In 
the first approximation, the answers will be used as 
a measurement of the lack of knowledge of nuclear 
vulnerability. Across the whole cohort, only 32.21 per 
cent of respondents said ‘No’ in one form or another, 
and the score decreases to 30.16 per cent when the 
sample is limited to respondents aged 21–30 years. 
Possession or hosting of nuclear weapons as opposed 
to a non-nuclear weapon status does not significantly 
correlate with the answers to this question.
Question 2. Is the accidental launch of a nuclear weapon 
possible? 
Respondents had to choose one of the following three 
answers: 
(a) Yes.
(b) No, but it was at some point in the past. 
(c) No, but there is a possibility of human 
miscalculation in a crisis. 
of terrorist attacks on Europe, and by further analysis 
of the existing results, which will be presented in a 
follow-on paper. 
Fourth, this study does not measure derealization, 
which is a first step in the fading awareness of nuclear 
danger and harm. Derealization can be defined as an 
attitude of knowledge about nuclear danger but limited 
belief in that knowledge and, as a result, impossibility 
to act on it. Scholarship has shown that the effects 
caused by nuclear weapons can be put at a distance, 
as if they were a pure abstraction. Even when they are 
made audible and visible, the adequate embodiment 
of those effects is missing and knowing them is not 
necessarily believing, let alone acting on what is 
known. Similarly, practices of virtualization and 
institutional and linguistic neutralization of nuclear 
harm have been exposed.18 Therefore, this paper only 
measures the existence, or not, of the ultimate form of 
fading awareness, which is absence of knowledge about 
the possibility of nuclear disaster. It does not deny the 
possibility, existence and problem of derealization 
and normalization of nuclear harm, which are not 
measured in this survey.
III. OUTCOMES FROM THE PUBLIC OPINION POLL
Public knowledge of nuclear vulnerability
States can no longer protect their populations against 
a nuclear attack. Since the coupling of thermonuclear 
weapons with intercontinental ballistic missiles 
launched from submarines in the 1960s, it is no longer 
possible to intercept the delivery vehicle of a nuclear 
attack in spite of all the expenses on missile defences.19 
As a result, European populations have been 
vulnerable to an accidental or deliberate nuclear 
strike coming from any nuclear-armed state targeting 
them. With the exception of Switzerland, which has 
developed a large-scale civil defence programme 
expected to be able to host its entire population, the 
18  Masco, J., ‘Nuclear technoesthetics: sensory politics from Trinity 
to the virtual bomb in Los Alamos’, The American Ethnologist, vol. 31, 
no. 3 (2004); Gusterson, H., Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the 
End of the Cold War (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1996), 
in particular chap. 3; Cohn, C., ‘Sex, death and the rational world of 
defense intellectuals’, Signs, vol. 12, no. 4 (1987); and Zwigenberg, R., 
Hiroshima: The Origin of Global Memory Culture (Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 2014). 
19  See Slayton, R., ‘The fallacy of proven and adaptable defences’, 
Public Interest Report, Summer 2014, <https://fas.org/pir-pubs/fallacy-
proven-adaptable-defenses/>. 
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While (d) maintains a potential openness to the 
possibility of a nuclear weapon-related disaster, (c) and 
(e) display an active absence of awareness and concern 
for the possibility of a nuclear weapon-related disaster. 
Here it is assumed that if the respondent believed a 
nuclear weapon catastrophe was a possibility,  
he/she would care. Finally, (b) is the equivalent of ‘not 
in my lifetime’ for respondents older than 14.20 On the 
other side of the spectrum, (a) is an active awareness 
of the danger turned into nuclear fear. So the study 
treats (b), (c) and (e) as forms of active denial of the 
problem of sustainability of a nuclear-armed world. 
This active absence of awareness remains constantly 
under 25 per cent for the respondents across country, 
age and gender, with an average of 20.01 per cent of 
respondents across all the EU countries remaining 
relatively stable across age groups. 
20  In 2001, when the youngest respondents were born, life 
expectancy at birth for women born in the EU was 81 years, compared 
to 74 years for men, see <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Mortality_and_life_expectancy_statistics>. 
These three answers do not presume a particular 
understanding of ‘accidental launch’. The study 
interprets (b) as meaning that this danger no longer 
exists and expressing a limitation in the respondent’s 
knowledge of nuclear vulnerability. This was a very 
rare response: only 17.64 per cent overall, and the score 
remains stable—at 17.31 per cent—when the sample is 
limited to respondents aged 21–30 years. In no country 
does this limit of knowledge exceed Italy’s 24.05 per 
cent, and 24.83 per cent among Italian respondents 
aged 21–30 years. The distinction between countries 
possessing or hosting nuclear weapons and others does 
not lead to significantly different answers.
Question 3. How much longer can we live in a world with 
nuclear weapons without a nuclear explosion happening 
in a context other than testing? 
Respondents had to choose one of the following five 
answers: 
(a) Not long—a nuclear incident, accident or war 
seems likely in the foreseeable future. 
(b) Another 70 years. 
(c) Forever.
(d) I don’t know. 
(e) I don’t care. 
Table 1. Modalities of the lack of knowledge of the possibility of a nuclear weapon-related disaster
European 
Union 
average (%)
France (%) United 
Kingdom (%)
Germany (%) Italy (%) Poland (%) Spain (%)
Lack of knowledge of 
nuclear vlunerability
32.21a
35.10b
30.16c
34.71
33.44
35.78
38.14
42.58
34.97
29.15
32.14
27.19
29.80
31.84
28.35
23.40
27.00
20.90
33.13
36.41
30.71
Lack of knowledge 
of the possibility 
of accidental use of 
nuclear weapons
17.64
18.09
17.31
19.65
19.17
20.05
17.18
18.84
15.99
12.68
15.08
11.09
24.05
22.95
24.83
10.26
9.86
10.54
18.80
17.78
19.55
Lack of knowledge 
of the existence of 
post-cold war cases 
of near nuclear use
38.83
40.11
37.91
40.03
40.59
39.57
40.44
41.39
39.76
30.07
32.88
28.21
33.88
32.88
34.59
46.93
50.77
44.27
46.84
48.07
45.93
Active denial of 
the problem of 
sustainability
20.01
21.21
19.16
21.63
21.38
21.82
19.65
24.00
16.56
17.36
18.10
16.87
18.23
17.63
18.64
31.66
32.03
31.39
14.51
15.77
13.59
a The first line in each entry is for all respondents.
b The second line in each entry is for respondents aged 14–20 years. 
c The third line in each entry is for respondents aged 21–30 years.
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use of nuclear weapons; and in Italy, about cases of 
near nuclear use. Both groups of respondents are fairly 
equal: in Poland, when it comes to knowledge of the 
possibility of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and 
in France, regarding the problem of sustainability of a 
nuclear-armed world. 
Third, some countries display a higher discrepancy 
between the two groups of respondents than others. 
The UK and Germany stand out with the younger 
cohort of respondents displaying less knowledge 
of nuclear danger across all four questions and 
with a really high discrepancy regarding nuclear 
vulnerability, the possibility of accidental use of 
nuclear weapons in the case of Germany and denial of 
the problem of sustainability of a nuclear-armed world 
in the case of the UK. If the knowledge of the older 
respondents about nuclear danger was raised after 
they turned 21, the apparent loss of knowledge of the 
younger respondents might just mean that they have 
not yet been educated about nuclear danger and that 
the same was true for the older group at that age. 
This would explain the UK’s anomaly. The level of 
debate on nuclear weapons in the UK over the last five 
years was unusual and might have created an increase 
in knowledge among citizens who focused on it, most 
likely those who were at voting age in the 2015 general 
election. However, it should be noted that the poll took 
place before Jeremy Corbyn, with an explicitly anti-
nuclear stance, became the head of the Labour Party, 
but that the Liberal Democrats modifying their stance 
on Trident and the Scottish National Party expressing 
an opposition to nuclear weapons opened a space for 
UK citizens to reconsider these issues. Whether or 
not younger people will also be made more aware as 
they grow older cannot be determined based on these 
results.
Overall, according to the results of the poll, the post-
cold war generation of EU citizens does not display a 
worrisome lack of knowledge of nuclear danger in any 
of the four aspects measured. The most striking lack of 
knowledge across countries has to do with the recent 
cases of near nuclear use, with a 38.8 per cent average 
and a score higher than 30 per cent across all countries; 
the slight rise in this lack of knowledge among younger 
respondents is neither steep nor uniform across the 
board. The possession or hosting of nuclear weapons 
rarely seems to play a visibly determining role in the 
results.
Question 4. How aware are you of post-cold war cases of 
near nuclear use? 
Respondents had to choose one of the following four 
answers: 
(a) I am aware of no cases—that was a cold war 
problem. 
(b) I can think of one case. 
(c) I think there was more than one case. 
(d) I think there were nuclear weapon incidents 
but none that could have caused a nuclear weapon to 
explode. 
Given that the seriousness of the 1995 Black Brant 
incident is still being debated, (a) is taken as revealing 
an explicitly limited knowledge of the danger.21 This 
limitation of knowledge is the strongest among the 
four questions but still does not affect the majority of 
respondents—38.83 per cent of them saw it as a cold war 
problem. Focusing on respondents aged 21–30 years, 
the number remains stable at 37.91 per cent. In Poland, 
Spain, France and the UK, more than 40 per cent of 
respondents treated cases of near nuclear use as a cold 
war problem. In that respect, the distinction between 
possession and hosting of nuclear weapons as opposed 
to a non-nuclear weapon status does not significantly 
affect the results.
Comparing respondents aged 21–30 years with 
those aged 14–20 years gives an approximation of the 
forgetting effect assumed in the literature within the 
post-cold war generation. On average, the respondents 
aged 14–20 years display a slightly higher rate of lack of 
knowledge than those aged 21–30 years, which might 
suggest a slight effect of loss of knowledge (see table 1). 
However, there are three important caveats. 
First, this trend is limited in scope: around 2 per cent 
in every question, except for the one on knowledge of 
nuclear vulnerability. 
Second, such loss of knowledge is not visible 
across the board. The younger respondents are more 
knowledgeable: in France, about nuclear vulnerability 
and the possibility of accidental use of nuclear 
weapons; in Spain, about the possibility of accidental 
21  On Black Brant, see Pelopidas, B., ‘Overconfidence and 
learning from nuclear false alarm: lessons on the Blank Brant XII 
event from an oral history workshop after twenty years’, Unpublished 
manuscript, Available on request. On cases of near nuclear use, see 
Lewis, P. et al., ‘Too close for comfort: cases of near nuclear use and 
options for policy’, Chatham House, London, 2014.
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to live under IS than to die in an accidental nuclear 
explosion?’ 
When asked to choose between ‘Yes’, ‘No’ and ‘I don’t 
have an opinion on this issue’, only 29.09 per cent of 
the respondents said ‘Yes’. In other words, less than 
30 per cent of the respondents saw this as a political 
condition worse than death in an accidental nuclear 
war. If the sample is narrowed to respondents aged 
21–30 years, the scores remain approximately the same: 
29.87 per cent said ‘Yes’. In the UK, the percentage of 
respondents who said ‘Yes’ is substantively higher: 
41.87 per cent for respondents aged 21–30 years. The 
surprise came from the French respondents: no more 
than 14.59 per cent of the French respondents said ‘Yes’. 
If the sample is restricted to those aged 21–30 years, the 
score rises only slightly to 16.40 per cent. 
This goes against the idea that the population of a 
nuclear-armed state is willingly putting its life in the 
hands of the president to make credible his retaliatory 
threat and accept that such a choice makes their 
country a target of other nuclear weapon states and, 
as such, a possible victim of accidental nuclear use. If 
this commitment were strong, many more respondents 
would have said ‘Yes’, portraying IS as much worse 
than a patriotic acceptance to exposure in the name 
of nuclear deterrence. The point remains valid even 
if IS does not acquire nuclear weapons. Interestingly, 
73.39 per cent of the respondents who self-identified as 
French said ‘I don’t have an opinion on this issue’ (and 
this drops to 71.95 per cent for respondents aged  
21–30 years). 
The distinction between nuclear weapon possessor 
or host and other types of state is not significant for the 
answers to this question. France and Spain have a much 
lower rate of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ answers and a much higher 
rate of people expressing their absence of opinion on 
the matter. 
Engagement in the debate on nuclear weapons
The absence of active support for a policy that relies on 
the acceptance of nuclear vulnerability as a condition 
for security is confirmed in the answers to the 
following question: ‘What three things hold you back 
most from engaging more in the debate over the future 
of nuclear weapons?’ 
One of the available answers was ‘I am generally 
content with the decisions made in my name’. Only 
23.45 per cent of the respondents included it as one 
of their three answers. There is not much variation 
around this average among the countries in the study; 
Public attitudes to current nuclear policies and 
continued exposure to nuclear vulnerability
Having documented the imperfections in knowledge 
of nuclear vulnerability above, this section focuses 
on the other three expressions of support for current 
nuclear weapon policies: (a) an acceptance of the 
above-mentioned vulnerability; (b) an expression 
of satisfaction with the decisions the government is 
taking; and (c) a sense that nuclear weapon possession 
makes people feel safe, as the weapons are justified by 
a security rationale. However, as will be shown in the 
new data below, none of those components is visible in a 
large fraction of the respondents.
Acceptance of nuclear vulnerability
As explained above, there are reasons to accept nuclear 
vulnerabilities. Drawing on the greatest political and 
social concerns in 2015, the assumption was made that 
for citizens of European countries living in democratic 
and liberal market economies with freedom of religion, 
the most opposed form of political organization would 
be to be governed by the Islamic State (IS). In other 
words, the contemporary equivalent of ‘better dead 
[in a nuclear war] than red’ that the poll intended to 
test was ‘better dead [in a nuclear war] than under 
IS’. In doing so, the goal was to see whether there was 
an equivalent of the cold war political acceptance of 
nuclear vulnerability in the name of the avoidance 
of a political outcome deemed worse. Of course, the 
comparison is imperfect given that the Soviet Union 
was perceived as both a territorial threat (via invasion) 
and an existential threat (via a nuclear strike), while 
the IS-sponsored nuclear terrorism threat is much less 
likely (since IS does not possess nuclear weapons) and 
is not the only threat. 
Nonetheless, the issue (and the specific question 
below) became more relevant when French Chief of 
Defense Staff, General Pierre de Villiers, explained on 
French national television that IS was in the process 
of becoming a state and that this development had to 
be monitored and correlated to nuclear weapons. In 
other words, he was paving the way for a justification 
of French nuclear deterrence against a future IS state.22 
The question to respondents was: ‘Would it be worse 
22  Gabet, S., ‘la France, Le Président, et la Bombe’ [France, the 
President and the Bomb], Broadcast on France 5, 22 Mar. 2016, Cited in 
Tertrais, B. and Guisnel, J., Le Président et la Bombe (Paris: Odile Jacob: 
Paris, 2016), pp. 215–16.
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the continent. To get a sense of this, respondents were 
asked the following question. 
Do nuclear weapons make you feel safe? 
Respondents had to choose one of the following four 
answers: 
(a) Yes, absolutely. 
(b) Yes, they make me feel safe from attacks by other 
countries, but I acknowledge that they also have risks 
attached. 
(c) No. 
(d) Yes and no: the ones that are located in my 
country and allied countries are a source of safety; the 
others are a concern. 
61.54 per cent of respondents simply answered ‘No’, 
and this increases to 65.48 per cent if the sample is 
limited to respondents aged 21–30 years. 
The rationale of current nuclear weapon policies 
on the European continent, nuclear deterrence in 
France and the UK, US-extended nuclear deterrence 
and non-proliferation, would be compatible with two 
of the four answers: (b) and (d). As suggested in the 
previous section, (b) would express support for the 
existing policies combined with knowledge of nuclear 
vulnerability and (d) is typical of a non-proliferation 
project.23 ‘Yes’ would be a pro-proliferation attitude 
and ‘No’ suggests radical opposition to any policies 
involving nuclear weapons.
However, more than 50 per cent of respondents 
expressed that nuclear weapons did not make them 
feel safe in every single country in the study with a 
representative sample of respondents, except for non-
nuclear armed Poland (42.53 per cent). Even in France 
and the UK, 51.16 and 54.37 per cent respectively of 
respondents shared this feeling. The exceptions were 
Polish respondents, and respondents aged  
14–20 years in the UK and France (53.81 per cent in 
France and 53.41 per cent in the UK), who said that 
nuclear weapons did make them feel safe (as opposed 
to their older counterparts). Notably, the share of 
respondents expressing that nuclear weapons do not 
make them feel safe reached 73.71 per cent in Germany. 
When limiting the sample to respondents aged  
21–30 years, the ‘No’ rate increases in every country 
with a representative sample, remains above 50 per 
cent in all of them except for Poland, and Spain displays 
23  Gusterson, H., ‘Nuclear weapons and the other in the Western 
cultural imagination, Cultural Anthropology, vol. 14, no. 1 (1999). 
for example, the score was 21.13 per cent in France, 
27.78 per cent in the UK, and a high of 29.28 per cent in 
Italy. Responses from the non-nuclear weapon states 
Poland and Spain are slightly below the average with 
20.34 per cent and 16.80 per cent respectively. 
It seems that these unexpectedly low numbers 
correlate more broadly with the level of popular 
support for a government at a point in time among 
young voters and are not specific to the nuclear issue. 
They remain meaningful in a context like France, in 
which the credibility of nuclear deterrence is expected 
to be based in part on the credibility of the leader, 
which in turn is determined by the support of the 
nation for that leader. In that particular setting, the 
two possible interpretations of these results mean 
the same thing. The results can either be interpreted 
as signs of very limited support for current nuclear 
weapon policies or as signs of very limited support for 
a particular government at a moment in time. Given 
the French articulation of the connection between 
the president, the support of the national community 
and the credibility of the deterrent threat, these two 
interpretations are equally significant of a problematic 
lack of support for existing policies.
There is another way of assessing the consistency of 
this lack of support for current nuclear weapon policies. 
In the UK and France, active support of current nuclear 
weapon policies would consist of assessing nuclear 
vulnerability in the following way. To the question 
‘Does the possession of nuclear weapons create 
vulnerability?’, the respondent would answer ‘Yes, it 
does’—which shows knowledge of the lack of protection 
against a nuclear attack whatever its origin—‘but this 
vulnerability is necessary for deterrence to work and, 
because deterrence works, we are not as vulnerable as 
it might appear’. This is one of the available answers. In 
France, only 34.72 per cent of the respondents gave that 
answer and 25.51 per cent in the UK. These scores are 
equally low if the sample is limited to respondents aged 
21–30 years (32.25 per cent in France; 25.61 per cent in 
the UK). 
Nuclear weapons and personal safety
In seeking to go one step further and trying to explain 
the absence of support beyond a general trend towards 
the decline of pro patria mori (sacrifice for one’s 
country) over the years, it is necessary to relate this to 
the primary mission of the nuclear weapons stationed 
in Europe: to guarantee the security of the countries on 
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than dying in an accidental nuclear war but there 
might be another outcome which would be worse than 
such a death. They might also have no opinion on that 
particular dichotomy and still support current policy 
in the name of the avoidance of invasion for instance.) 
In the UK, support across the board would be 27.78 per 
cent and 27.10 per cent if focusing only on the group 
aged 21–30 years. 
Does the public no longer care about nuclear 
weapons? 
A common assumption about the attitude of the next 
generation of EU citizens towards nuclear weapons is 
that they no longer care enough. This is why, according 
to pro-disarmament circles, there are no longer 
protests worldwide as there were in the 1980s. To 
assess this assumption, two questions were designed.
Question 1. What three things hold you back most from 
engaging more in the debate over the future of nuclear 
weapons? 
Respondents could choose three of the following six 
answers: 
(a) I can’t affect the outcome. 
(b) I’m too busy on things that more directly affect my 
life.
(c) I don’t know what the answers are. 
(d) My country does not have the influence. 
(e) I am generally content with decisions made in my 
name. 
( f ) I am worried about the impact on my reputation/
job/standing with the government. 
(g) I don’t care. 
Question 2. What global issues do you think will affect 
your life most in the coming half century that might 
motivate you to take action?
Respondents could choose three of the following six 
answers: 
(a) The spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
weapon use. 
(b) Global terrorism.
(c) Threat of attack or invasion by another state. 
(d) Climate change and ecological destruction/
breakdown. 
(e) Exhaustion of key resources.
( f ) Global poverty and inequalities. 
(g) Financial breakdown.
the highest rate. (In France, it increases by 4 per cent 
to 55.28 per cent; in the UK, by 5.5 per cent to 59.92 per 
cent.) 
It should also be noted that this component of 
support for current nuclear weapon policies tends to 
score higher than the other two—acceptance of the 
above-mentioned vulnerability, and expression of 
satisfaction with the existing policy. This finding needs 
to be analysed in connection to the limitations of the 
knowledge of nuclear dangers, in particular when it 
comes to accidents, as demonstrated in the previous 
section. Moreover, it is noticeable that a significantly 
larger share of the respondents aged 14–20 expressed 
that nuclear weapons make them feel safe than those 
aged 21–30.
Overall, the constituency that actively and 
consistently supports current nuclear weapon policies 
in this representative sample of Europeans aged  
14–30 years is very limited. Even when assuming 
complete knowledge of nuclear vulnerability, which 
is a generous assumption as suggested in the previous 
section, only a very small portion of the respondents 
expressed an acceptability of the vulnerability they 
are put under, an active satisfaction with the policy 
conducted in their name and a sense of safety derived 
from their state’s or its protector’s nuclear weapons 
(see table 2). 
If consistency across those three modalities of 
support is assumed, meaning that the respondents 
expressing support in one modality are also expressing 
support in the other two, the lowest share of expression 
of support of the three should be treated as the highest 
possible share of support across all three modalities. 
Therefore, at best, 23.45 per cent of respondents fully 
support current nuclear weapon policies while being 
fully knowledgeable of the vulnerability they create—
consistency checks will be applied and the results will 
be presented in a follow-on paper. 
The fragility of that support also appears with 
support being higher among respondents aged 
14–20 years (for the last two criteria in table 2, out 
of four across all countries), who are slightly less 
knowledgeable of nuclear danger. In the two European 
nuclear weapon states, support across all four aspects 
is also very limited, much more so in France than in the 
UK. In France, support across the board is not higher 
than 14.59 per cent and 16.40 per cent if focusing only 
on the group aged 21–30 years. (Answers to the first 
question are deemed irrelevant because respondents 
might feel that living under IS would not be worse 
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care for the issue. 34.23 per cent of respondents chose 
‘I don’t care’ as one of their three answers. This partly 
addresses an objection to the validity of the results, 
which consists of claiming that those who chose to take 
part in the poll about nuclear weapons care more than 
the average population. They had other incentives to 
answer the questions. 
There is almost no gender difference in the score 
(33.86 per cent for self-identified females and 34.59 per 
cent for self-identified males) and the score only drops 
slightly when focusing on respondents aged  
21–30 years (32.44 per cent). In that case too, the 
distinction between nuclear weapon states and non-
nuclear weapon states does not make a significant 
difference, with non-nuclear Poland and Spain 
displaying scores five points higher than the average 
and almost nine points lower (39.62 per cent and 
25.94 per cent respectively), with nuclear-armed UK 
somewhere in between (30.35 per cent). France stands 
out with a score of 51.03 per cent, which remains stable 
when only considering respondents aged 21–30 years 
(50.68 per cent). 
The limits of this common assumption that popular 
attitudes to nuclear weapons are careless, except 
The answers to the second question suggest that 
this generation is not on the verge of mobilization 
regarding nuclear weapon issues and does not expect 
to actively engage in it. Of course, a few leaders would 
be sufficient to make a difference but only 27.67 per cent 
of respondents included the spread of nuclear weapons 
and nuclear weapon use in their three answers. 
This is the lowest score among all issues across the 
whole cohort of respondents and it remains the lowest 
score if the scope is narrowed to respondents aged 
21–30 years (26.33 per cent). It is also the lowest score 
for both genders (25.79 per cent for self-identified 
female and 29.47 per cent for self-identified males). It 
is the lowest score in all countries except for Germany 
(29.47 per cent), where the threat of attack or invasion 
scored even lower (27.48 per cent). On that issue, the 
distinction between nuclear weapon state, non-nuclear 
weapon state and hosting state does not make a 
difference. France and Spain have the lowest scores, 
22.72 per cent and 22.86 per cent respectively, and 
Poland and the UK have the highest scores, 29.77 per 
cent and 29.28 per cent respectively.
However, the absence of or limited mobilization does 
not result from an active and acknowledged absence of 
Table 2. Modalities of support for current nuclear weapon policies
European 
Union 
average (%)
France (%) United 
Kingdom (%)
Germany (%) Italy (%) Poland (%) Spain (%)
Acceptability of 
nuclear vulnerability 
(Islamic State 
is worse than 
accidental nuclear 
death)
29.09a
27.97b
29.87c
14.59
12.41
16.40
41.75
41.58
41.87
35.66
34.52
36.41
32.70
34.66
31.32
33.02
30.59
34.69
17.78
16.35
18.84
Content with the 
decisions taken in 
one’s name
23.45
25.65
21.89
21.13
23.07
19.51
27.78
28.72
27.10
19.53
21.44
18.27
29.28
30.09
28.70
20.34
25.13
17.03
16.80
19.02
15.16
Feel safe 38.46
44.03
34.52
48.84
53.81
44.71
45.63
53.41
40.07
26.29
28.40
24.89
30.63
34.77
27.70
57.47
62.46
54.03
25.56
31.20
21.40
Note: The results for ‘Feel safe’ aggregate all the expressions of feeling of safety, including the potentially pro-proliferation 
variant answer ‘Yes’ without qualifiers which, while expressing safety, is not compatible with the current policies of European 
nations.
a The first line in each entry is for all respondents.
b The second line in each entry is for respondents aged 14–20 years. 
c The third line in each entry is for respondents aged 21–30 years.
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the decisions taken now will impact many EU citizens—
including those not yet born or not yet of voting age. 
However, the results of the poll of more than 
 10 000 EU citizens aged 14–30 years, in August 2015, 
suggest that none of these assumptions is true.
First, the lack of knowledge about nuclear danger is 
not as rampant as commonly assumed. Among those 
aged 14–30 years, it only increases very slowly, not 
uniformly and possibly masks the simple fact that 
citizens become informed about nuclear weapons in 
their 20s. Therefore, the greater lack of knowledge 
among younger citizens simply suggests that they 
may not have been informed yet. However, it should 
be reiterated that this study could not fully measure 
derealization: respondents might know things but 
not fully relate to them. A lack of knowledge about 
post-cold war cases of near nuclear use seems the most 
concerning aspect of this lack of knowledge, with up to 
40 per cent of the cohort manifesting it. 
Second, even if a reasonable amount of understanding 
of nuclear danger can be documented, it does not 
translate into an expression of support for the existing 
nuclear weapon policies conducted in the name of the 
people of the EU. Support combining the criteria of 
feeling of safety, satisfaction with policies taken in one’s 
name and acceptation of nuclear vulnerability is lower 
than 30 per cent in every country for which there was 
a representative sample of respondents, if consistency 
is assumed. Even if this low level of support reflects the 
overall level of support for governments at the time of 
the poll, this is meaningful in countries where active 
popular support is meant to justify nuclear threats and 
make them credible. 
The next generation of Polish citizens stands out as 
pro-nuclear weapons and increasingly so—62.46 per 
cent of the respondents aged 14–20 years expressed 
that nuclear weapons made them feel safe (8.43 per 
cent more than those aged 21–30 years) and Poland 
has the highest rate of active denial of the problem of 
sustainability of a nuclear-armed world (a stable  
31.66 per cent versus the average 20.01 per cent)—but 
that does not translate into support for existing policies 
conducted in its name.
Finally, the absence of mobilization of the youngest 
generation does not reflect tacit support for existing 
policies or lack of concern about the issue, but rather a 
strong feeling of powerlessness, of inability to change 
the outcome (72.38 per cent on average and more than 
70 per cent whichever way you narrow the data, by 
country with a representative sample, age or gender).
in the French context in which the active effort 
towards demobilization on the issue seems to have 
been successful, are visible in the answers to another 
question. When asked ‘How much longer can we live 
in a world with nuclear weapons without a nuclear 
explosion happening in a context other than testing?’, 
respondents had the possibility to answer ‘I don’t care’. 
Only 6.83 per cent of respondents chose to do so and 
the highest score across the countries was Poland, with 
12.95 per cent (France scored higher than average but 
not as high, with 8.94 per cent).
Instead of carelessness, a feeling of powerlessness to 
influence the outcome is widespread across the whole 
cohort. More than 70 per cent of respondents  
(72.38 per cent) expressed a feeling that they could 
not affect the outcome as a reason why they do not 
participate in the debate about the future of nuclear 
weapons. This remains true for respondents aged  
21–30 years (73.8 per cent). This is also true for every 
single country in the study for which the cohort 
questioned was large enough to be representative, 
meaning France, the UK, Germany, Italy, Poland 
and Spain: in all of those countries, more than 71 per 
cent of respondents expressed the same feeling of 
powerlessness. 
The most important finding remains that whichever 
way the data is narrowed, by country, age or gender, 
there is always more than 70 per cent of respondents 
expressing a feeling of powerlessness in affecting 
nuclear weapon policy choices in every country for 
which there was a representative sample.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
European nuclear weapon policymakers and 
commentators commonly assume that European public 
opinion is increasingly forgetful and indifferent about 
nuclear weapon-related issues (as the spectre of the 
cold war moves back in time), but still tacitly supportive 
of the policies conducted in its name. 
These assumptions are all the more important as 
several of the democratic polities composing the 
members of the EU are making decisions to modernize 
their nuclear arsenals and to continue hosting US 
weapons. This will commit their future citizens to 
living in a nuclear-armed continent for most of their 
lives, without giving them a say in the matter. Given 
that nuclear weapon modernization plans extend the 
lifespan of the weapons over at least the next 40 years, 
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it hit the ground, spilling radioactive material.24 In 
spite of this, Spanish respondents displayed a slightly 
higher lack of knowledge of the possibility of accidental 
use of nuclear weapons, 18.80 per cent versus the 
average 17.64 per cent (see table 1). 
In other words, history is not enough: an active 
programme to unearth it and keep it alive is required. 
The programme should address the possible 
derealization of nuclear danger and harm that this 
study could not measure and avoid overconfidence 
and the retrospective illusions of safety and control. 
It should expose the trade-offs and bets on the future 
attached to every possible nuclear weapon policy 
choice, so that citizens feel re-empowered and so that 
their concern for nuclear weapon issues does not simply 
turn into ‘I don’t know what the answers are’ (45.67 per 
cent of the cohort explained its limited to non-existent 
participation in the debate on the future of nuclear 
weapons this way). It would need to go beyond an 
instrumental view of technology and incorporate the 
role of luck in the issue of nuclear crises, in order to 
revive informed democratic engagement.25 
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Implications for research and policy
The conclusions above have several implications for 
further research and future policy. 
Regarding research, it would be worth polling a 
similar sample of the European population again, in 
order to see whether the observed attitudes are stable 
over time. A contrasting poll, including people who 
had received their voting rights by the end of the cold 
war, would also be a way of more robustly measuring 
the forgetting effects and the potential for generational 
change. A forward-looking approach would consist 
of adding questions about how respondents were 
sensitized to the issue and how old they were when 
they first thought about nuclear weapons. 
That might unveil the existence of future thresholds 
beyond which the forgetting effect might accelerate. 
The passing away of the Hibakusha (the surviving 
victims of the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki) is only one of those possible thresholds. 
It might also reveal that the forgetting phenomenon 
has to do with the orders of magnitude of the nuclear 
weapon phenomenon (i.e. the number a weapons 
in a given country, the damage they can cause and 
their cost) rather than the fundamentals of nuclear 
vulnerability.
Regarding policy, an educational policy aimed 
at spreading knowledge of nuclear vulnerability 
among future EU citizens could be an option. Issues 
surrounding nuclear weapons could be taught as part 
of the curriculum in mandatory school. For example, 
teaching about cases of near nuclear use could address 
the problem of the slightly lower knowledge of nuclear 
danger among citizens aged 14–20 years. This would 
require an active research programme on nuclear 
history and a connection between the latest scholarship 
on these issues and high school teaching. 
This is all the more important as the countries that 
have had serious nuclear weapon-related accidents do 
not display a significantly higher level of knowledge—
not even the UK, where discussions about nuclear 
weapon issues have been significantly more active, 
stands out in terms of knowledge. Spain, for example, 
had the historic accident of Palomares. On 17 January 
1966, a US B-52 collided with a KC-135 tanker during 
a refuelling mission near Palomares. The bomber 
exploded, killing seven crew members, and four 
hydrogen bombs fell to the earth. The conventional 
explosive material for two of the bombs exploded after 
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counter proliferation. To that end, the network can also 
establish cooperation with specialized institutions and 
research centres in third countries, in particular in those 
with which the EU is conducting specific non-proliferation 
dialogues.
http://www.nonproliferation.eu
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FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH 
FRS is an independent research centre and the leading 
French think tank on defence and security issues. Its team of 
experts in a variety of fields contributes to the strategic 
debate in France and abroad, and provides unique expertise 
across the board of defence and security studies. 
http://www.frstrategie.org
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IN FRANKFURT 
PRIF is the largest as well as the oldest peace research 
institute in Germany. PRIF’s work is directed towards 
carrying out research on peace and conflict, with a special 
emphasis on issues of arms control, non-proliferation and 
disarmament.
http://www.hsfk.de
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC 
STUDIES
IISS is an independent centre for research, information and 
debate on the problems of conflict, however caused, that 
have, or potentially have, an important military content. It 
aims to provide the best possible analysis on strategic trends 
and to facilitate contacts. 
http://www.iiss.org/
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to 
research into conflict, armaments, arms control and 
disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, 
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to 
policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. 
http://www.sipri.org/
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